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Article 5

EQUITY'S JURISDICTION OF CHATTEL
MORTGAGES
Chattel mortgages are an ancient field of equity jurisdiction. Statutes have regulated priority; they have created
rules regarding recording and renewal. But the relation between the chattel mortgagor and mortgagee has long been
and continues a province of equity jurisdiction. The growth
of the jurisdiction is best indicated by an analysis of the
legal basis of chattel mortgages. At law the mortgagor conveys a legal title in the property to the mortgagee which is
absolute but this title returns to the mortgagor on the condition of payment by him of an indebtedness at an agreed
time. In Hughes v. Harlam 1 the Court of Appeals of New
York stated the legal rule in these words:
"When the security consists of personal property the instrument
pledging it as security for a loan operates to transfer the legal title
to the mortgagee, to be defeated only by the full performance of the
condition; or as it is expressed by Beardsley, J., in the old case of
Charter v. Stevens, 3 Denio 33, the mortgage transfers 'a defeasible
title to the property mortgaged.' The mortgagor can revest himself by

complying with the conditions of the defeasance, but, if he fails to do
it, he has no remedy at law."

At law, failure to comply with the conditions results in
forfeiture. Equity, as a general rule, relieves from forfeitures,
under certain conditions, and this power gave equity courts
a basis of jurisdiction over chattel mortgages, which was
stated and applied by the New York Court of Appeals in
Hughes v. Harlam. In a court of law the mortgagor's rights
are ended on the failure to pay at the time agreed. The
mortgagee's estate was absolute at the making of the mortgage, and on default the reversion lapses. But equity says
that upon certain conditions the mortgagor may still avoid
the forfeiture and redeem. In Hughes v. Hartam the New
York Court of Appeals said:
1 166 N. Y. 427, 432, 60 N. E. 22, 24 (1901). See, also, Darrow v. Wendelstadt, 60 N. Y. S. 174, 43 Am. Dec. 426 (1899).
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"Courts of equity, however, long ago decided that a mortgagor so

situated might be permitted to redeem."
The conditions that govern this right to redeem are several. They do not require tender of the sum due.2 As one
case says, the tender only bears upon the plaintiff's (mortgagor's) willingness to do equity. The suit in equity for
redemption permits a computation of the amount due with
interest and the decree directs payment as a condition of
redemption and failure to make the payment results in a
decree of foreclosure. The suit in equity must be brought
promptly. It must be free from laches. It must be brought
before the right of redemption is cut off by a valid sale by
the mortgagee. The mortgagee upon default may cut off
the equitable right of redemption by one of two possible
proceedings, that is, by a sale conducted in good faith or
by a foreclosure suit in equity brought by the mortgagee. 8
If the mortgagee elects to proceed by sale to cut off the
equity of redemption, he does not, by the process of conducting a sale, put himself or the mortgage beyond the range
of an equity court. Equity still retains the right to examine
the nature of the sale and its good faith. In Freeman v.
Freeman4 the New Jersey Court of Chancery has stated this
power in these words:
"A sale of the chattels by a mortgagee or pledgee, in the absence
of statutory regulations, is attended with some difficulty and embarrassment. The conduct and fairness of the sale, and the rights acquired under it, are always open to investigation at the instance of

the mortgagor or pledgor. Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisker,
1 Stockt. 667, 687-9; Same v. Lewis, 1 Beas. 323."

With respect to the sale, equity requires the exercise of
good faith. It has no set regulations and the cases are the
only guide as to what equity deems good faith. There is no
rule as to advertising or notice but if the seller undertakes
2

Bernheimer & Schwartz Pilsner Co. v. H. Koehler Co., 42 Misc. Rep. 377,

86 N. Y. S. 716 (1904).

8 Freeman v. Freeman, 17 N. J. Eq. 44 (1864).
4 Op. cit. supra note 3, at 47.
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to give such notice it must be reasonable." The property
must be in the view of the bidders at the time of sale and
must be sold in such lots as will bring the best price.6 The
mortgagee may become the purchaser but the price must be
fair.7 The purpose of the sale is to ascertain and estimate
value, and courts of equity insist upon sales of such a character as to fulfill that function; and equity finds its guide
as to reasonableness in a rule of the common law with respect to judicial sales. Such was the rule adopted and applied in Sherman v. Slayback 8 Sales conducted by mortgagees against mortgagors in distress and which are part of
a scheme to deprive the mortgagor of a part of the property
to the mortgagee's benefit are within the equity jurisdiction
and voidable under the rules laid down in the cases cited.
If the mortgagee relies upon an agreement with the mortgagor under which and in execution of which such sales are
held, the agreement may be examined by equity and voided
along with the sale under the equitable rules covering the
preservation of the equity of redemption.
Before discussing the nature of the equity of redemption,
the rule of waiver' may be noted with respect to both forfeiture and sales. Waiver is a rule of equitable nature, but
with respect to chattel mortgages it is applied by courts of
law as well as those of equity. There are some old cases decided as law actions which state the rule with the sharpness
and clarity of lightning. In Charter v. Stevens 1 o Beardsley,
3., wrote:
"It has been adjudged that a tender of the mortgage money, after
default in payment, would not, at law, re-invest the mortgagor with
5 Morrisania Laundry Service v. Strauss, 137 Misc. Rep. 48, 242 N. Y. S. 579
(1930); Fleischmann v. Clausen, 225 N. Y. S. 288, 222 App. Div. 7 (1927).
6 Sherman v. Slayback, 58 Hun. 255, 12 N. Y. S. 291 (1890).
7 Casserly v. Witherbee, 119 N. Y. 522, 23 N. E. 1000 (1890).
8 Op. cit. supra note 6.

9 As stated in Taylor v. Goelet, 208 N. Y. 253, 101 N. E. 867, Ann. Cas.
1914D, 284 (1913).
For an application of the rule to chattel mortgages, see Hutchings v. Munger,
41 N. Y. 155 (1869).
10 3 Den. 33, 35 (1846). This case is quoted as an authority in Hughes v.
Harlam, 166 N. Y. 427, 432, 60 N. E. 22, 24 (1901).
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his former title to the property;

Patchin v. Pierce [12 Wend. 61

(1834)] . . .and [Brown v. Bement and Strong] 8 John. 96 [1811];

but an acceptance of the amount tendered, that is, full payment being
made, at any time, would, as between mortgagor and mortgagee,
extinguish all right and interest of the latter in the property mortgaged.
If made before the pay day had passed, it would satisfy the conditions
on which the property had been transferred, and thus defeat it
altogether; and, if made after forfeiture, it would be conclusive evidence the forfeiture had been waived, and that all right under the
mortgage was extinguished." Patchin v. Pierce, supra; Parks v. Hall,
2 Pick. 206, 210, 211 [1824]; Barry v. Bennett, 7 Metc. 354, 360, 361
[1844]; Hatch v. White, 2 Gall. 152 [1814]."

There are several similar decisions at law with respect to
waiver." In equity upon payment the mortgagee becomes
a trustee and is bound to account to the mortgagor 12 and the
result of waiver operating by payment arises in a different
way and as if in different dress. In Earle v. Gorham Manufacturing Co.1" equity applied the usual rule of waiver with
respect to installment payments under a chattel mortgage
holding that when the mortgagee accepts an overdue installment he obliterates the forfeiture and restores the previous
status.
Equity has another field of jurisdiction with regard to
chattel mortgages. This might be described as an inherent
jurisdiction. It is founded in the very nature of the transaction. Like a red twine it runs through the entire cord. It
is so mixed with the substance it may not be refined from it.
Lord Eldon said: "You shall not by special terms, alter what
this court says are the special terms of that contract." "4It
is expressed in the aphorism: Once a mortgage always a
mortgage. If the conveyance or assignment was a mortgage
in the beginning the right of redemption is an inseparable
incident and cannot be restrained or clogged by agreement.
11 Barry v. Bennett, 7 Metc. 354 (1844); Hutchings v. Munger, op. cit.
supra note 9; Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61 (1834); West v. Crary, 47 N. Y.

423 (1872).
12

13
14

Charter v. Stevens, op. cit. supra note 10.
2 App. Div. 460, 37 N. Y. S. 1037 (1896).
Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. Jun. 265, 273, 32 Eng. Rep. 108, 111 (1802).
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The rule may be made clear by an analysis of one of the old
cases which sustain it. In Clark v. Henry,15 an equity action,
we find this statement of facts and finding: Henry purchased
of Clark a span of horses and a wagon for $285 which was
to be paid on January 1, 1820. It was not paid, and on February 16, 1820, Clark asked for security and took an assignment of a bond and mortgage upon real-property as security.
Henry filed a bill in equity to redeem. The answer set up the
assignment of the mortgage was absolute, that Henry
not having funds to pay had executed an agreement that"the
assignment would become absolute if the money was not
paid by October 1, 1820. The chancellor held the bond and
mortgage were assigned by way of mortgage and any agreement that the assignment was to be an absolute sale, without
redemption upon default of payment, was oppressive, illegal
and void, and that the equity of redemption still existed in
the plaintiff notwithstanding such agreement. Upon appeal
the judgment was affirmed, Woodworth, J., saying:
"The right to redeem is carefully protected by courts of equity.
They will not suffer- an agreement to prevail, tlat the estate shall
become an absolute purchase in the mortgagee, upon any event whatever. The reason of the rule is, because it puts the borrower too much
in the power of the lender, who, being distressed at the time, is generally too much inclined to submit to -any termS. There is no exception to the rule 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage.' (I Madd. 413).
No agreement of the-parties can affect the doctrine as to redemption
in a-court of equity."

This rule precludes all covenants in the chattel mortgage
whereby the mortgagor surrenders the right to redeem. In
Mooney v. Byrne 16 the Court of Appeals of New York says:
"The right to redeem is an essential part of a mortgage, read in by
the law, if not inserted by the parties. Although many attempts have
been made, no form of covenant has yet been devised that will cut
off the right -of a mortgagor to redeem, even after the law day has
long -passed by. (Clark v. Henry, 2 Cow. 324, 331.; Jones, Mortg.
§ 1039."
15
18

2 Cow. 324 (1823).
163 N. Y. 86, 92, 57 N. E. 163, 165 (1900).
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The extent of this jurisdiction of equity is further shown
by its approval by the Supreme Court of the United States
17
in Peugh v. Davis.
While the inception of this jurisdiction rests in the idea
that what is given by way of security may not be treated
by the taker as absolute nevertheless it rests also in the more
persistent right of redemption which is branded into the
transaction by equity so that it becomes, in the words of
Lord Eldon, "the special terms of the contract." Agreements between the mortgagor and mortgagee, made after
the contract of chattel mortgage, are, also, within its orbit.
Clark v. Henry is an example. At no place in the course of
the relationship may the mortgagee, by contract, and by
"friendly" sale, escape beyond the jurisdiction. In Peugh
v. Davis the Supreme Court of the United States wrote with
respect to releases subsequent to the mortgage:
"A subsequent release of the equity of redemption may, undoubt-

edly, be made to the mortgagee. There is nothing in the policy of the
law which forbids the transfer to him of the debtor's interest. The
transaotion will, however, be closely scrutinized, so as to prevent any

oppression of the debtor. Especially is this necessary, as was said on
one occasion by this Court, when the creditor -has shown himself ready
and skilful to take advantage of the necessities of the borrower.

Russell v. Soutkard [12 How. 139 (1851)]. Without citing the authorities, it may be stated, as conclusions from them, that a release to the
mortgagee will not be inferred from equivocal circumstances and loose
expressions. It -must appear by a writing importing in terms a transfer
of the mortgagor's interest, or such facts must he shown as will operate
to estop him from asserting any interest in the premises. The release
must also be for an adequate consideration; that is to say, it must
be for a consideration which could be deemed reasonable if the trans-

action were between other parties dealing in similar property in its
vicinity. Any marked undervaluation of the property in the price paid
will vitiate the proceeding."

The jurisdiction of equity, when once established, is
equal to the purpose of affording full relief. If the mortgagor establishes his right to an accounting and the mort17 96 U. S. 332, 337 (1877). See, also: Conover v. Palmer, 123 App. Div. 817,
108 N. Y. S. 480 (1908); Hughes v. Harlam, op. cit. supra note 10; Casserly v.

Witherbee, op. cit. supra note 7.
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gagee has sold, lost or otherwise converted the chattels,
the court may make reparation in damages.' s The theory
of accounting on the basis of value is followed. The mortgagor may not compel the mortgagee to purchase at a price.
The same theory of value applies if the mortgagee after an
alleged seizure retains the chattels for his own use. If after
proper seizure he seeks to collect the indebtedness he must
credit the mortgagor with the value at the time of seizure
and the indebtedness is reduced by that value. 9 If the
value is less than the indebtedness, the balance may be
recovered; if it is greater, the surplus must be accounted
for to the mortgagor. The mere seizure does not in itself
discharge the indebtedness; this is controlled by the rule
of value.
Perlie P. Fallon.
New York City.

18 Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. Prac. 296, 307 (1872); Flanders v. Chamberlain, 24 Mich. 305, 321 (1872); Blodgett v. Blodgett, 48 Vt. 32, 34 (1876).
Equity practice also differs from legal practice in that equity looks to condi-

tions at the close of the trial rather than beginning of the action,. Haffey v. Lynch,
143 N. Y. 241, 248, 38 N. E. 298, 299 (1894).
19 Harrison v. Hall, 239 N. Y. 51, 145 N. E. 737 (1924).

